Category: Social Media

Finding links between ISIS, online disinformation and Islamophobia

I’m currently very interested in looking for possible links between the 2014 emergence of Isis and the disinformation campaigns currently plaguing social media. Both aim to poison public perceptions of Muslims. Could sentiment analysis help to draw the link between the two? The process could begin by mapping the sentiment in relation to certain keywords when political events occur involving Muslims. It could also be interesting to map public sentiment towards Muslims after terrorist attacks happen around Europe and the UK. This would likely produce spikes of negative sentiment, as would be expected.

But can social media evidence be found that points to a long-term trend for increased negativity towards Muslims? And can this be mapped convincingly to the starting point of the dramatic emergence of Isis in summer 2014? Can we then compare this period of two or three years with the period from 2001 (after 9/11) all the way through to 2013? I’m curious to know whether the online content put out by Isis can be linked in some way with various amplification campaigns by Russian bots or sock puppets. It is becoming common knowledge that actors sympathetic to Russia have been manipulating Western social media opinion in the run up to both Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. Russia has also been accused of orchestrating this manipulation in various national elections across the European Union.

The rise of the far right, which helped bring about Brexit and Trump, seems to have happened in tandem with the emergence of Isis. If Islamist extremists and far right extremists are, as some experts argue, just two sides of the same coin, then it would be logical for their trajectories to run in parallel. But how has this relationship played out on social media? Significant proportions of the public now spend massive amounts of time on social media, which has largely replaced television and newspapers as the architect of public opinion. Therefore, whoever controls social media messages has a good chance of controlling public opinion.

With phenomena such as viral content and the rise of memes, there is much opportunity for malicious actors with vested interests to sow chaos and promote confusion. But is it really feasible that the world’s present direction has been orchestrated by certain groups? For argument’s sake, let’s assume for a moment that Russia is the architect of the current situation. The term ‘disinformation’ comes from the Russian phrase dezinformatsiya, the Cold War name of a KGB department specialising in black propaganda.

Moreover, Russia has always been known for its commitment to long-term strategic military thinking. During the Cold War, Russia was the underdog, with fewer resources than the wealthy United States. To hold its own, Russia was forced to develop its capabilities in a more strategic manner, going above and beyond traditional military power. This parallels how the online world works, which has long been the domain of the underdog, the misfit, the bootstrapper, and the hustler. People who seem powerless have strategically used the Internet to gain the upper hand in many walks of life. It only takes one video or blog post going viral, and the resulting following can transform the nerdiest bedroom dweller into an overnight Internet celebrity, with the ability to reach a wide audience. It doesn’t seem much of a stretch to imagine a clever government could easily harness this sort of power to pursue its own interests.

Social media has become the lens through which millions of people view the world. If that lens is warped, then their perceptions can be easily manipulated. Some would argue with this perspective, saying that it denies people their agency, portraying them as passive actors who soak up messages without any critical thinking. The decline of the attention economy is also relevant here. Our attention spans have been hijacked. Studies have shown people are losing the ability to concentrate for long periods of time. Instead, our brains now seek the instant hits of dopamine available from notifications and popups. Facebook and Twitter have had a profound effect on our societies, where large swathes have willingly eroded their own abilities to focus. It is certainly not difficult to conceive that certain actors would take advantage of this to push their own agendas.

Reflections: Terrorism and Social Media Conference 2017

Last week, in a sleepy Welsh city by the sea, a group of social media and terrorism researchers came together to discuss the latest challenges in the field.

I learned a lot, met people doing admirable work and came away inspired with ideas to shape my own research in the future. This post is a short synopsis of topics from the conference that struck me as important, interesting and/or particularly thought-provoking.

The visual web

Maura Conway’s opening keynote was peppered with mentions of the visual web – and it’s importance in the study of terrorist and extremist activity. All extremist groups have a visual profile, and many use images as a central feature of their propaganda and recruiting efforts.

One look at the ISIS propaganda magazine, Dabiq, proves this point. And it’s not only about images, but also video, which terrorist groups have used for decades, from the grainy, muffled bin Laden recordings all the way through to the glossy ISIS productions. Far-right groups use images too – from the notorious Pepe the Frog to a range of logos featuring swords, swastikas and national flags.

The ‘post-truth’, digital era has ushered in a trend for using images as part of disinformation efforts; driving so-called ‘fake news’. A recent example springs to mind from the March 2017 Westminster attack. In the swirling social media aftermath of Khalid Mahmood’s actions there emerged a photo of a Muslim woman wearing a hijab, walking past victims across Westminster bridge, engrossed in her phone as she walked.

The image was quickly hijacked, attached to numerous false claims attacking the unknown woman for her apparent ‘disdain’ for the injured victims. These claims spawned thousands of comments where people released their Islamophobic feelings to the full, feeding into the milieu of anti-Muslim sentiment that presently hangs over society.

Of course, the truth was very different. The woman had been messaging friends and family to let them know she was safe after the attack. Despite the truth being outed, the damage had already been done. Social perceptions of Muslims as ‘bad’ had been further reinforced.

Back to Prof Conway’s speech; in which she highlighted the ‘strong signalling function’ of images, making them critical subjects for further analysis. Yet most terrorism analysts still focus primarily on text, because the analysis of images is more challenging. Visual analytics tools and techniques do exist, both qual and quant, with big data research on images being especially popular in communication science at the moment.

In short: we need to pay more attention to the visual nature of the internet – and focus more on these ‘low-hanging fruit’ of visual analytics in the study of extremism.

The far-right

TASM didn’t focus only on the Islam-related side of extremism, but showcased a balanced view across the spectrum, with plenty of emphasis on research into the far-right. I attended several interesting panel talks on this subject, and came away with a number of key points.

One piece of research compared Britain First with Reclaim Australia, aiming to draw out the nuances within the umbrella term ‘far-right’. Methodology involved corpus assisted discourse analysis (CADS) on a static dataset, showing text that Britain First and Reclaim Australia supporters had posted on social media over a three-month period.

The researchers used a social media insights tool, Blurrt, to gather raw data, then used Python scripts to sort it into a workable format before finally analysing using CADS. In particular, they focused on collocations to reveal telling patterns in ideas and sentiments across the two groups.

Findings included a strong pattern of ‘othering’ – the core ‘us versus them’ narrative (which is a common theme not just among far-right discourse but also in some mainstream media and foreign policy: e.g. the Iraq war – ‘Axis of Evil’).

It was unsurprising therefore to find that Muslims and immigrants were particularly targeted. In what appears to be an extension of the ‘us versus them’ theme, ‘metaphors of invasion’ were often found in the discourse of both groups.

Other common themes included mentions of ‘our women’, ‘our religion’ and ‘our culture’ as being under threat from the ‘invaders’. All these themes feel very masculine. It could be interesting to reflect on the proportion of these sentiments that come from male authors; and could also be worth analysing what far-right discourse looks like from a female perspective.

In general, researchers concluded that far-right propaganda is less ‘overtly’ violent than that of ISIS, and is mainly rooted in nationalistic tendencies. This raises many questions. Is this how the far-right have managed to fly ‘under the radar’ for so long? Are they seen as being defensive rather than offensive? (And hence the ‘good guys’ on some level).

Could that be a factor in the much-discussed media under-reporting of far-right crimes, while focusing almost hysterically on those perpetrated by jihadists? Or, are ISIS and similar viewed as ‘worse’ simply because they are more ‘other’ (i.e. racism)?

Resonant narratives

Just as in commercial marketing, narratives work best when they intersect with individual agency and contexts. In his panel talk, Dr Akil Awan pointed out that CVE campaigns must not neglect the real-world issues that allow extremist narratives to resonate in the first place.

So how do ISIS narratives achieve success? They play on themes of belonging and identity; important for people experiencing ‘dual culture alterity’, i.e. feeling alienated from both their parents’ culture and the culture of their country of upbringing. In these cases, a return to fundamentalism becomes an ‘anchor’; a default setting of identity in a sea of alienation.

Awan highlighted the disparity between perceptions and reality around the true numbers of Muslims living in European countries. The media drives much of this misperception; making people feel ‘under siege’, creating fear, driving societies apart and destroying any sense of cohesion. In such a milieu, it is easy for ISIS to ‘eliminate the grey zone’ by means of terrorist acts. The media has already primed society for ISIS to succeed.

Understanding perceptions is as important as understanding reality; because how people perceive something will guide their course of action in response to it. Current CVE campaigns (based around tools such as counter-narrative videos) are cheap to implement and make it look like governments are taking action.

But recognising the ‘lived experience’ of minority groups is one of the keys to successful CVE efforts; neglecting to do so is hypocritical and unlikely to be effective.

Conclusion

In closing, we heard from the arbiter of all this – Facebook. Dr Erin Saltman explained the tools Facebook uses to tackle the online side of extremism and terrorism. These tools include a database of extremist propaganda images that relies on machine learning to match images as they surface, and automatically remove them.

But machine learning has its limitations, and humans are still required to take into account context and nuance. At present, the two work in tandem to surface the content (machine learning) and then interpret it as needed (humans).

Other tools include Facebook Insights, commonly used in commercial marketing, but can also be leveraged to guide counter-speech initiatives and enable precise reading of audiences.

The age of social media, although still in its infancy, has already had profound impact on politics and society – as well as the individual psychology of internet users. The long-term effects are unknown, with many changes no doubt still on the way.