Author: sjnorth

Troll farms and terrorism

In the wake of the Manchester attack, I noticed many angry, hateful and Islamophobic comments on Facebook. Many came from profiles that didn’t look human. On closer examination these profiles seemed designed to spew hate speech, mainly about Islam and Muslims. Once set up, the owners of these profiles insert their hateful remarks into relevant comment threads, seeking reactions from the general public – from the genuine ‘organic’ Facebook users.

As well as eliciting angry reactions these comments amplify hate and division in society. They change people’s perceptions, making them feel surrounded by fear and hate. Repeated themes pop up in comment sections, often including the same tropes about Islam (e.g. burkas are taking over, sharia law will engulf the UK, paedophile comments about the Prophet Muhammad, all Muslims sympathise with Isis, all Muslims hate the West, why don’t Muslims condemn Isis, etc).

Such repetition may plant ideas in the minds of susceptible individuals. The bandwagon effect is at work. People read Facebook comments sections, see a lot of hateful remarks about Islam and tend to agree without critique. In the wake of a dreadful terrorist attack, people may feel justified in doing this. Hence the seeds of fear and hate of the ‘other’ are sown within a society already made vulnerable by the aftershock of an attack, even more effective because it targeted children and young people.

The question is, what are these commenters trying to achieve? They may be bots, or real people managing an army of profiles at the same time, using persona management software of some kind. So many more questions emerge from this. Who is managing them? Who is funding them? What is their political goal? And what measures can we take to inoculate the people, especially the young, from reading and absorbing these comments without taking a critical approach. A fearful populace is so easy to manipulate.

The fact that children were killed further discourages any critical stance. It leaves the person publicly trying to understand the drivers behind the attack open to accusations of ‘sympathising’ with the attacker. That’s never a pleasant position to be in. It can mean that some who would otherwise have spoken out in support of a more nuance and critical response to this attack are afraid to do so, because they don’t want to be accused of sympathising with individuals or organisations who would murder children.

The Manchester incident has ratcheted up the stakes. Whoever is influencing this sideshow must be satisfied with the political and social response to the Manchester attack. It’s not far-fetched to surmise that these attacks and their responses could form part of a wider strategy. We need to ask ourselves questions such as: How does a terrorist group begin? What is it responding to? What are its end goals? Could the idea of Isis supporters wanting to build a caliphate be purely part of the fantasy narrative put forward by or on behalf of the group?

Perhaps the people who pull the Isis strings don’t care if a caliphate ever gets established. Instead the group is just a tool, a powerful and dangerous one. Its actions and its mythology tell a brutal yet compelling story. The story is manipulated by cynical strategists to effect political change on a global scale, by playing on negative perceptions and people’s deep rooted suspicions of the ‘other’, in this case Muslims. Making people band together with the familiar is easy in times of fear. It’s simply a self protection mechanism, part of human nature to exclude the stranger in order to protect the known.

It would be useful to have an easy way of telling when a profile has been set up purely for the sake of propaganda, and when its just owned by a real and hateful human being. Even people who hold racist, Islamophobic and anti-semitic views are unlikely to spend the majority of their time on social media mouthing off about these views. They would surely do other things on their profiles too, like share photos of family members, holidays, pets, work, life and so on. Even racists have normal lives. But for the trolls and bots, hate is the centre of their identity. Their social profiles reflect this, even when they try to appear ‘human’.

They have no other reason to exist except to spread hate. I’m convinced these profiles all share a set of common features, with elements that don’t quite ring true, perhaps related to the type of language they use to post the comments. Are there patterns in the choice of words? Do they tend to repeat the same tropes about Islam again and again? What are these tropes? Is the language that of a native English speaker? Or are there certain idiosyncrasies that point to a shared origin point?

Let’s consider this from a public relations perspective. What would be the most emotive targets for terrorist attacks? Of course children, the most innocent of targets. That would be certain to generate the most intense possible public reaction and outcry, as it did in Manchester. Timing is also important, so the attack needs to be tied to current events. In the UK that could be the upcoming general election and the start of Ramadan. Tensions between different groups in British society are already running high, thanks to the Westminster attack a few weeks earlier. Although far fewer people died than in Manchester, the public was further primed for holding negative and hateful views about Muslims in general.

Once the shocking event has been carried out, the next step is to implement the social media strategy. And this is where tools like troll farms and bots become very useful. They, or their operators, wade into the comments sections of relevant articles on social media and/or the mainstream press (probably finding these articles through brand discovery tools or Google Alerts). They then post repetitive comments, memes and supposed ‘debunking’ videos designed to show everyone the so-called true nature of the ‘barbaric’ Islam. Over the long term, this causes an overall shift in perceptions of Islam in the minds of real humans reading these comments and soaking up their negative sentiment.

In this social media age it’s easy to build long-term, wide-ranging and multifaceted PR and content strategies to influence entire swathes of populations. From fake videos and doctored images, to armies of commenters posting fake opinions on social media, it all creates a climate of fear and uses it to shift perceptions of certain groups. This is perfectly plausible. I aim to explore the practical aspects of how this is achieved, in order to devise ways to neutralise it. Perhaps we can somehow prepare the minds and world views of young people so they face the digital world with more critical eyes. We should educate them about the presence of trolls and bots and show them how to spot real human opinions.

Who’s winning on the digital battlefield?

On the eve of the French presidential elections, there’s a sudden flurry of activity on social media. A candidate’s name – #Macron – is trending on Twitter. So what’s the news? A large stash of Emmanuel Macron’s private emails have been hacked and leaked online.

Sound familiar?

That’s because it’s happened before. You probably remember last year’s debacle about Hillary Clinton’s leaked emails. This more than likely contributed to her losing the election to Donald Trump. If nothing else, it created an air of public suspicion around Clinton that did irreparable damage to her reputation. I still think back to that hacking event and recall it as a haze of rumours and misinformation; I was never totally clear what the core of the issue really was.

And in light of this latest development with France, I begin to wonder if confusion is actually the goal in all this. Perhaps we give whoever is behind this too much credit by assuming they’re actually pulling the strings of public opinion. What would be easier, and perhaps just as damaging, would be simply to sow the seeds of mistrust. With everyone at each others throats, arguing bitterly about what is and isn’t ‘fake news’, there’s room for the malevolent forces to continue their underhand work of sabotaging democracy. When journalists digging deep to report the truth on something can so easily have their work discredited as ‘fake news’ by none other than the US president himself, we really are veering into a disturbing new reality.

Who is actually responsible for this mischief? Sources point to a Russian hacking group known, among a variety of other names, as “Fancy Bear”. It’s the same group said to be responsible for hacking Hillary Clinton’s emails last year. “The key goals and objectives of the campaign appear to be to undermine Macron’s presidential candidacy and cast doubt on the democratic electoral process in general,” said Vitali Kremez, director of research at Flashpoint, a business risk intelligence company in New York, in an interview with the New York Times.

We should not underestimate the abilities of Russia in this arena. Dmitri Alperovitch, of CrowdStrike, told the MIT Technology Review that Russia ‘gets the true nature of the battlefield’ in a way the West does not. “They’ve been thinking about this for a very long time,” he said. “It actually goes at least as far back as the Tsarist era in the 1860s, when they created one of the first modern intelligence agencies, the Okhranka.” So Russia has been doing this sort of thing for decades, but the rise of digital offers the perfect new landscape for even deeper subterfuge.

But there’s one ray of hope; and that’s in how the French media has responded to the Macron email leak so far; by not reporting on the contents of it. This seems a smart move. Part of French law requires candidates to stop campaigning between midnight on Friday to when the polls close at 8pm on Sunday. Candidates are forbidden to give media interviews or issue statements. The timing of the email hack was likely designed to coincide with this, in an attempt to release the emails while Macron was unable to respond. But denying the fake news trolls the oxygen of media publicity cuts the head off the snake; removing much of its potential to harm. The same goes for terrorist incidents. ‘Propaganda of the deed’ as terrorism was once known, relies on shock and awe to achieve its ends. In an ‘always-on’ digital society this effect is massively amplified and completely fake incidents can even be instigated, by anyone anywhere. If the media had denied the ‘oxygen of publicity’ to groups like Isis from the very beginning, the world might be less messy today.

The emergence of Isis fuelled the rise of the far-right, giving white supremacists and ultraconservatives the opportunity to rise up and gain power under the guise of ‘protecting’ the nation from threat. Of course that ‘threat’ is constantly portrayed as emanating from Islam and Muslims. And so the cycle continues. But the example of France is certainly a promising one. The election outcome will reveal if it actually worked. Perhaps going forward, these issues could be mitigated by a more scrupulous mainstream media, one that’s less desperate for ‘clicks’ to ensure its survival, along with citizen journalism collectives such as Bellingcat, to shed light on old issues and reveal new cracks in existing narratives.

Images of Islam: How fake news drives public opinion about Muslims

“During times of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act”

– George Orwell

Through misinformation to political change

Misinformation about Muslims (including refugees, immigrants and ordinary citizens) has been used to construct harmful narratives, reinforce existing Islamophobia and, arguably, create a fertile environment for enacting profound social and political change. Although the role of Islamophobia in the media has been explored in depth, less research has been done into social media, especially the role of social media images. These images are highly susceptible to manipulation when taken out of context, or attached to wholly fake news. They can be used to promulgate certain political agendas, heighten divisions in society, and cause actual harm to vulnerable groups.

In March 2017, shortly after Khalid Masood attacked Westminster, a certain image began circulating on social media. It depicted a young woman wearing a hijab. She had a distressed expression, clutching her phone as she walked across Westminster bridge. Behind her, one of Masood’s victims lay on the pavement, surrounded by concerned passers-by. The image went viral across Twitter, Facebook and a range of anti-Islam blogs.

The intense discussion it generated focused on the recurring narrative of the woman showing ‘disdain’, which degenerated into intense Islamophobic stereotyping. Some users implied that the woman had sympathies with the Westminster attacker. Others posted tweets and comments in her defence but the damage had already been done. It seemed as if yet another layer had been added to long-standing negative public perceptions of Islam and Muslims.

Going viral: Islamophobia online

There are many studies on the portrayals of Islam and Muslims in the print and television media. However, the social media realm remains relatively under-studied in this regard, in relation to its size, prevalence and increasing influence upon shaping social attitudes. Research suggests that negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims remain frequent in the social media context (Törnberg and Törnberg, 2016).

Users commonly perceived Muslims as ‘a homogeneous out-group embroiled in conflict, violence and extremism’ (ibid., p.133). In general, Muslims and Islam are regularly portrayed in the UK media in a variety of negative contexts, such as being a ‘threat to security’, a threat to ‘our’ way of life’, and positioned as being perpetually in conflict with mainstream ‘British values’. (Moore et al, 2008).

Moreover, media coverage of Muslims seemed to have ‘gained its own momentum’ (ibid., p. 10) over time, starting with 9/11 and growing since then. It suggests the presence of innate Islamophobia, where journalists do not question the dominant narratives of Muslims but simply perpetuate them. In terms of images, the research found that the most dominant images were those of lone Muslim males, particularly in police mugshots, suggesting associations with terrorism, extremism or deviance (for example, the hook-handed cleric Abu Hamza was frequently featured).

Subjects of images were commonly located outside police stations or law courts. In addition, Muslims depicted in media images were most often found in prayer, preaching, or in protest groups. This indicated a primary focus on themes either of terrorism or of cultural/religious differences, among the majority of media images depicting Muslims (ibid., p. 28).

Poole (2002) reinforces these findings, claiming that topics commonly associated with Muslims and Islam have included ‘terrorism’, politics and reactions to the war in Iraq. News coverage tends to link Muslims to global events, creating strong associations between Islam and situations of conflict and violence. Where there is domestic coverage, it tends to highlight situations that ‘focus on social tensions’, ‘raise questions over loyalty and belonging’ and consistently cast Muslims as being in opposition to ‘traditional British values’. Deep-rooted perceptions of Muslims as ‘the other’, combined with suspicion around their loyalty to ‘British values’, and ‘our’ way of life, could ignite feelings that spur users to believe negative fake news in relation to Muslims, and share images and stories that support their beliefs without engaging in critical analysis.

In recent years a fresh series of newsworthy incidents related to Muslims, such as the murder of Lee Rigby, various ISIS atrocities, and attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin and London, have encouraged members of the public to express their opinions about Islam and Muslims on social media. People have also become more likely to share images associated with Muslims without stopping to check their veracity.

Muddying the narrative: fake news 

This has led to the spread a number of ‘fake news’ stories, where images of Muslims have been linked with certain news events, taken out of context, or used to create entirely fake news. In these cases, it is not merely the mainstream media to blame. Members of the public can easily create and share fake news, contributing to reinforcing negative perceptions of Muslims and perpetuating an ongoing narrative that has the potential to do harm.

Online narratives can also cause harm in the real world, as explored by Imran Awan (2016) in his research linking a rise in hate crimes against Muslims to a corresponding rise in Islamophobic content being shared on Twitter and Facebook. Awan argues that a large proportion of comments posted on social media about Muslims possessed an ‘extremist and incendiary undertone’. He offers a typology of Facebook Islamophobia in an attempt to explain what compels people to post and share such content (ibid., p. 8).

None of the aforementioned studies, however, specifically explore the role of images on social media. Images can be powerful, even more so than words, and they dominate the contemporary media landscape. Digital technology has opened up new avenues for ordinary users to create, edit, and doctor their own images. Images on social media therefore play an important role in constructing fake news and driving the narratives that fulfil political agendas. This is a significant area worthy of further exploration.

Bored of selective outrage

When I first heard the news about yesterday’s incident at Orly Airport in Paris, my first thought was ‘I hope he’s not Muslim’.

I’m not Muslim. So why do I care?

Because I’m bored of the constant stream of outrage. I dislike how people on Twitter and Facebook revel in lambasting all Muslims because of one more incident that supposedly ‘proves their point’ – that all Muslims are part of some dastardly global terrorist plot. It feels as if these commenters are watching and waiting, ready to pounce with their vitriol as soon as news of an incident breaks, no matter how minor.

I can’t subscribe to any view of Muslims being innately prone to terrorism because of their religion. Part of that inability comes from my being a reasonably intelligent and cosmopolitan human, but otherwise it’s because this outrage is selective, misdirected and full of holes – and that bothers me.

In fact, it infuriates me.

Can’t mentally ill people and criminals be Muslims too? Or are those categories reserved for white people? Can’t the two things be mutually exclusive, rather than religion being treated as the sole defining factor?

Why is it always the same old story every single time? Couldn’t a random guy, prone to criminality, perhaps suffering from mental illness (but who just happens to be from a Muslim background, with a Muslim name and brown skin) one day decide to attack people in an airport?

Anyone can claim their deeds in the name of Allah. It doesn’t necessarily make them part of a wider terrorist plot. With the constant public hysteria surrounding ‘Islamic terrorism’, widely reported, it’s not hard to imagine someone latching onto it as support in their criminal mission, even if they aren’t religious at all. It’s part of the bandwagon effect.

Out of interest, I compared Google results for the Orly incident with the recent Canadian mosque shooting. In the former incident, only the perp died. Arguably, he brought it on himself by trying to grab a soldier’s weapon in an airport. And he was already an experienced criminal known to the police.

But in the Canadian incident, six innocent mosque-goers were murdered by a white man with a gun. He had no criminal background whatsoever. There would have been no way to predict the attack. I find that terrifying.

The first page of Google speaks for itself. The Orly would-be attacker, once his identity emerged, was immediately labelled ‘radicalised Muslim’, and his attack (which killed no-one except himself) described as being ‘treated as a possible act of terror’.

Whereas Alexander Bissonette, the mosque killer, is described as a ‘student’, a ‘suspect’, and perhaps, in one of the more critical headlines, a ‘mosque shooter’. Even worse, an innocent witness of Moroccan background was mistakenly thought to be the shooter, before the real one was identified.

Al Jazeera describes Bissonette as ‘a French-Canadian university student known for his far-right views’. The word ‘terrorist’ is suspiciously absent from most of the coverage.

Yet this guy murdered six people because of their religion. He was driven by extreme right-wing, white supremacist political views. He killed for the sake of those views. Is that not the very definition of terrorism?

Terrorism has been around for a long time. It was around in the French Revolution, where Robespierre and the Jacobins conducted their ‘Reign of Terror’.

It was around in imperial Russia, where disgruntled students became ‘radicalised’ and committed public attacks – ‘propaganda of the deed’ – designed to create fear and bring down the ruling regime.

And terrorism was very much around in the late 20th century when the Irish Republican Army conducted attacks across the UK. These groups are only a few of the thousands of armed resistances that have existed throughout history; there are many more, spanning a wide range of cultural contexts.

They have cropped up wherever inequality and injustice are found, in a misguided attempt to somehow ‘redress the balance’ and achieve a ‘better life’ for themselves via the cause they represent, despite the warped methods they choose to get there.

The point is: terrorism is not specific to any religion, race, nationality or culture. We need to stop treating it as such.

It would help if we could put terrorism into perspective. But that will remain difficult unless the language we absorb from the media every day is adjusted to portray a more balanced picture of what’s really going on in the world. Although in this era of clickbait for revenue, perhaps that’s just a futile dream.

Nevertheless, we can do our part to help by thinking critically beyond the headlines and continuing to call out selective outrage whenever and wherever it occurs.

Inciting the Interwebs: A short history of ISIS propaganda

ISIS is becoming old news these days. Recent coverage of the group talks about reclaiming its territory, freeing its captives, or the implications of its dwindling supply of funds. One gets the impression that the group’s very survival is now on the line. To an extent, ISIS has lost some of its former potency. Written from the perspective of a content strategist, combined with insights from academic experts on terrorism, this article will explore the various elements of ISIS propaganda; how they work together to promote the group’s goals; the ingredients of its success; and how ISIS might maintain its brand in future, in the light of recent territorial losses.

Many of horror: viral videos 

Not long ago, ISIS was shocking the world on a regular basis with its barrage of blood-drenched videos, gory tweets and declarations of violence against the West. At the time, there seemed no limit to the group’s barbarity. I remember travelling to Amman in early March 2015, just weeks after ISIS released a video showing the immolation of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh. The Jordanians I met on that trip were sombre yet enraged. They wanted to wipe ISIS out immediately, and the government responded to public sentiment without hesitation; promptly executing ISIS-linked prisoners and launching warplanes against ISIS targets within a matter of days.

Kasasbeh’s murder displayed a shocking new angle of ISIS brutality, which had already been established via previous videos showing the beheadings of Western captives. At the time, these videos were the most visible aspect of the group’s strategy vis-a-vis Western audiences. The intention was to incite fear and provoke responses, both of which worked very well. The videos initially gained traction from widespread sharing across ISIS social media accounts. Social media companies targeted and shut down these accounts en masse, but the videos had already gained such notoriety in mainstream media that many people sought them out nevertheless.

Goals, target audience and ‘customer’ personas

The foundation of a good content strategy is knowing who it’s for and what their problems are. Using that knowledge for guidance, content can be produced to address those problems and offer helpful solutions. In the case of ISIS, the intended target audience is large, consisting of Muslims the world over. ISIS wants to convince its audience that restoring the caliphate and building a ‘brave new world’ is their religious duty. But of course, not every Muslim is susceptible to this narrative; in fact, most don’t support ISIS at all. So ISIS went a step further and segmented its target audience to focus on those with more specific grievances. Perhaps some parts of the target audience were angry at the humanitarian situation in Syria. ISIS offers them a solution: come join us and fight against Assad, freeing the Syrian people (fellow Muslims) from tyrannical and secular rule. ISIS also offers a compelling narrative of friendship and belonging, which is undoubtedly appealing to those who feel they don’t fit into Western society. Apart from violence designed to intimidate the enemy, ISIS propaganda also includes ‘fluffier’ images of its members eating chocolate and playing with kittens (a nod to the Prophet Muhammed’s fondness for cats). A sense of religious duty forms the overarching ‘grand’ narrative, drawing on themes from the Qur’an and various Hadiths (sayings of Muhammed) to create credibility and imbue ISIS content with indubitable religious overtones.

Varied mediums, consistent messages

ISIS first become notorious via its shocking videos, along with the resulting press coverage and wider discussion they generated. If anything, the mainstream media was the most important vehicle for spreading these videos around the world, helping ISIS establish its brand and gain infamy. We can link this effect directly to the 21st century media business model that relies on clicks to earn its money. But that’s a topic for another article. Most content strategists these days like to put video at the forefront of their campaigns, as it’s emotive and generates much attention, with YouTube alone receiving billions of hits every month. ISIS doesn’t just make videos of blood and gore. The group also makes a whole range of propaganda videos full of positive sentiment, displaying life inside the ‘caliphate’, promoting the ‘duty’ of jihad, and showing testimonials from the group’s foreign fighters.

Apart from video, ISIS leverages a number of other mediums to spread its message and achieve its goals. Twitter was a key element in the early days, with ISIS supporters using techniques such as hashtag hijacking to make sure the content reached wide audiences. For example, during the Brazil World Cup in 2014, ISIS supporters ‘imaginatively hijacked hashtags such as #Brazil2014, #ENG, #France and #WC2014 to gain access to millions of World Cup Twitter searches, in the hope that users would follow links to the group’s propaganda video.’ (Farwell, 2014)

On top of smart moves like the above, the group’s armies of supporters would be constantly tweeting pro-ISIS messages in both English and Arabic, praising victories and challenging opponents, while offering tantalising glimpses of the attractions of life inside the Syrian ‘caliphate’ in Raqqa. After Twitter and Facebook started mass takedown campaigns of jihadist accounts, ISIS supporters were driven underground into the dark recesses of the ‘deep web’, and also onto encrypted channels such as Telegram. But for those who want to find it, ISIS content is never far away, and has firmly established itself on a number of regular channels outside the reach of the authorities. And by now it hardly matters, as the brand of ISIS has been built and has acquired the desired resonance, as well as, some might claim, the desired geopolitical effects.

Reshaping perceptions: Dabiq

The magazine Dabiq is another core element of ISIS content strategy. Produced in English, with slick and professional design, Dabiq is a cut above the jihadist magazines that came before. According to a 2016 analysis by Haroro J. Ingram, Dabiq has two goals: 1) to convince its target audience to travel to the caliphate, and 2) to convince them to conduct acts of domestic terrorism. It does this by offering its audience an ‘alternative perspective’ of the world that drives their radicalisation, while also using diverse messaging to create a ‘broader system of meaning’ (Ingram, 2016) that resonates at a deeply emotional level with its audiences. Good content marketing is all about engaging with emotions, which accounts for much of the success both of Dabiq and of ISIS content strategy as a whole. The Ingram analysis is particularly interesting, because rather than simply attributing ISIS’s success to its sophisticated content production techniques, Ingram delves deeper and explores the group’s attempts to shift the perceptions of its readership using carefully crafted messaging that resonates at fundamental levels.

Louder than bombs: the mainstream media

For ordinary content marketers, coverage in the mainstream media is one of the best forms of publicity available. Every day, companies spend a lot of money on PR activities to get their brand in front of journalists and featured in the news. As a terrorist organisation, ISIS also understands the power of the mainstream media and has harnessed it to devastating effect; ‘louder than bombs’ according to Charlie Winter’s recent Media Jihad report.

Based on Winter’s analysis of an ISIS-produced strategy document entitled Media Operative: You Are a Mujahid Too, the report details exactly how ISIS constructs its highly coherent and carefully planned media strategy. One prong of the strategy involves the mainstream media, which the document calls the ‘media weapon’. The below quote in particular shows how ISIS aims to use this ‘weapon’.

“Anyone who knows the Crusaders of today and keeps track of that which infuriates them understands how they are angered and terrorised by jihadi media. They – the curse of Allah the Almighty be on them – know its importance, impact and significance more than any others!”

ISIS strategists know how to manipulate the mainstream media for the group’s own ends. In today’s clickbait world, the more shocking the story the more airtime it gets. As a result, the deeds and hence the group responsible for them attract even more attention; analysis, critique, anger, hatred, disgust, and sometimes, inspiring love and obsession.

Media ‘jihad’, as ISIS calls it, has ‘ “far-reaching potential to change the balance in respect to the war between the Muslims and their enemies” and, for that reason, “is no less important than the material fight.”. Not only does it offer a way to “intimidate and threaten the enemy with violence,” it can make adversaries act irrationally by “infuriating them” and ensnaring policymakers into ill-conceived knee-jerk politics’ (Winter, 2017).

The latter is precisely what has happened. The world’s media has responded predictably to every piece of ISIS propaganda, disseminated it far and wide, and in the process made the group legendary for its brutality. In the short time since ISIS emerged the world’s mood has shifted. We have become more suspicious of strangers, more fearful, and less compassionate. Hatred and distrust between Muslim communities and non-Muslims has reached a fever pitch, culminating in major political shifts that gave us Brexit and Trump’s presidency. Those campaigns gained momentum by playing on people’s deep-seated fears of the ‘Other’, in this case Muslims. Without the fearful propaganda of ISIS writ large in the minds of Western populaces, perhaps matters would have turned out differently. Sowing discord was always part of the strategy, and it’s working. The question is now, how to reverse the tide?


References

Haroro J. Ingram (2016) An analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine, Australian Journal of Political Science, 51:3, 458-477, DOI: 10.1080/10361146.2016.1174188

James P. Farwell (2014) The Media Strategy of ISIS, Survival, 56:6, 49-55, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.985436

Charlie Winter (2017) Media Jihad | http://icsr.info/2017/02/icsr-report-media-jihad-islamic-states-doctrine-information-warfare/